ព័ត៌មានអន្តរជាតិ

Editorial: North Korea-Russia Relations: The Honeymoon Phase May Be Over

Cha, Du Hyeon Principal Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies

On Apr. 26, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov mentioned

that he wanted to give credit to North Korean troops who had made great

contributions to liberating the Kursk region when he was debriefed to President

Vladimir Putin via video call on Russian troops’ reclamation of territory in Kursk

occupied by Ukrainian forces. Moscow officially acknowledged the deployment of

North Korean troops in six months following the initial suspicion raised by the

Ukrainian intelligence authorities in Oct. 2024 that Pyongyang sent its troops to the

Russia-Ukraine war. Thereafter, Pyongyang also announced a written statement in

the name of the Central Military Commission of the Korean Workers’ Party,

disclosing its troops dispatch while commending the troops for their “heroic feats”

and “significant contributions” and assessing the dispatch of its troops and the

recovery of Kursk as “a historic new chapter for the North Korea-Russia relations,

marking the pinnacle of strategic alliance and brotherhood.”

President Putin exchanged handshakes with North Korea’s military delegation

at a Victory Day military parade held in Moscow on May 9. Kim Jong-un highlighted

“eight decades of unshakable friendship and solidarity of the two”, claiming that

North Korean and Russian troops eliminated their “shared enemy” and its

participation in the battlefield was legitimate as its “sovereign rights”. On the face

of such remarks and their closer ties, the two seem to be demonstrating a stronger

alliance which has been reignited after the signing of the North Korea-Russia Treaty

on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Jun. 2024.

At the same time, what lies beneath is a subtle divergence in how the two

sides interpret their bilateral relationship. First, even though Russia and North Korea

have officially acknowledged the deployment of North Korean troops, there are

some nuanced differences. Unlike the North which has described the deployment as

heroic acts and claimed such military contributions are reciprocal, Russia has not

mentioned its role in matters related to the Korean Peninsula while recognizing

North Korean troops’ contributions. Indeed, Russia has limited the collaboration with

North Korea to the Russia-Ukraine War while Kim firmly stated that “any

aggression” by South Korea or the US on the Korean Peninsula would be countered

“in accordance with the the provisions and spirit of the North Korea-Russia Treaty”.

Such differences were also observed during the military parade on the Victory Day

held in Moscow. Some had speculated that Kim would attend the parade, but he

did not. This may suggest that the Victory Day event attended by various parties—

did not align with his intention to showcase their close ties. In other words,

Moscow which has already gained the upper hand in the Ukraine war may have

wished to avoid a situation in which their relationship would be highlighted, unlike

Pyongyang, which is eager to emphasize their ties at home and abroad.

Second, as North Korea and Russia strengthen their ties, there is a possibility

of disagreements arising during the interim settlement process in which they discuss

what they can offer each other. On top of that, it can be said that North Korea

has already conveyed its intentions by Kim not attending Russia’s Victory Day

celebrations. Despite North Korean troops’ contribution to the recapture of Kursk,

currently, there is no indication that North Korean troops have been deployed to

eastern Ukraine in which Russia is intensifying its offensive. Having already

demonstrated its ability to supply Russia with weapons and troops, North Korea

may intend to convey a message that Russia’s further demands should be matched

by greater compensation. It may have already received or been promised food,

energy, and conventional weapons from Russia in exchange for its artillery shells,

ballistic missiles, and deployment of troops. Kim may now demand something

beyond what he has previously received-possibly technology and components for its

recently-revealed submarine and 5,500-ton destroyer, as well as nuclear-related

technology, but Russia’s response remains unclear.

Third, the North Korea-China relations, as well as the relationship between

the two leaders, may also be considered variables. The strengthening of North

Korea-Russia ties may strain North Korea’s relationship with China, which accounts

for over 90% of North Korea’s foreign trade. It is uncertain how long North Korea

can endure such a risk. Given that Russia has been increasingly depending on China

after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, it also has to recalibrate the level of

alignment with North Korea. The fact that all three countries North Korea, China,

and Russia are characterized by an authoritarian one-man dictatorship serves as an

incentive for collaboration, while also posing potential challenges. The dictator has a

desire for control and dominance, and the desire usually reaches beyond internal

governance and into foreign relations. As Kim Jong-un and North Korea who seek

to establish themselves as an equal partner with China and Russia and to drive the

trilateral cooperation at times, there is a possibility of a rift among the leaders,

with China and Russia trying to keep North Korea still in a junior partner role.

In some ways, the close ties between North Korea and Russia may have

already entered a period of adjustment, having passed the honeymoon phase. The

fact that the two have officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean

troops in the war suggests that such an adjustment has already begun. Initially,

both were reluctant to officially confirm the deployment of North Korean troops,

with Moscow calling it “a matter between the two” and Pyongyang describing it as

“an action in accordance with international legal norms”. The significant losses that

North Korean troops inevitably experienced in the early stages of the deployment

may have played a key role in this reluctance. In addition, their deliberate wait for

a more opportune moment for propaganda purposes is evidence that they

themselves have acknowledged the unjustifiability of the deployment. North Korea

will likely demand substantial compensation for its heroic achievements, but Russia’s

calculations may now take a different turn after having narrowly avoided a critical

Situation.

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